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ABSTRACT
After the Second World War, Canadian parliamentarians showed growing interest in inter-
national students coming to Canada. The students became the subject of policy talk, which 
was shaped by powerful discourses emerging from the larger historical context. From 1945 to 
1969, international students were seen as worthy recipients of Canadian aid, an idea that was 
premised on the belief that they were temporary visitors to Canada who would return to their 
home countries with both the skills they learned in Canadian schools and with an overall good-
will towards Canada, a valuable commodity in the Cold War context. But after the Sir George 
Williams University affair of 1969, parliamentarians’ tone changed, and international student 
policy talk became suffused with discourses of fear and danger. In the years after 1969, interna-
tional students were imagined as both politically and economically dangerous, an attitude that 
emerged as a reaction to student protest, but also reflected worries among some policymakers 
that Canada’s changing immigration system, and its move away from primarily Europeans 
sources for immigrants, was a threat to the stability of Canadian culture.
RÉSUMÉ
Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les parlementaires canadiens ont montré un intérêt crois-
sant pour la venue au pays d’étudiants internationaux. Ces derniers devinrent un sujet de 
discussions politiques qui donna lieu à des discours émouvants alimentés par un vaste contexte 
historique. De 1945 à 1969, les étudiants internationaux étaient vus comme des récipiendaires 
dignes de l’aide canadienne. Cette idée s’appuyait sur l’impression qu’ils étaient des résidents 
temporaires au Canada et qu’ils retourneraient dans leur pays non seulement avec les com-
pétences acquises dans les établissements d’enseignement, mais qu’ils afficheraient aussi leur 
bienveillance envers le Canada, une valeur inestimable dans un contexte de Guerre froide. 
Cependant, après l’affaire de l’Université Sir George Williams, en 1969, le ton des parlemen-
taires canadiens a changé. Les discussions politiques sur les étudiants internationaux furent 
teintées par des idées de peur et d’appréhension. Après 1969, on imagina les étudiants inter-
nationaux comme dangereux sur les plans politique et économique. Cette attitude fut une 
réaction aux protestations étudiantes, mais reflétait également les préoccupations de certains 
politiciens face aux changements du système d’immigration qui ne privilégiait plus les étu-
diants venus d’Europe, ce qui présentait une menace à la culture canadienne.
In 1976, Progressive Conservative MP Gordon Fairweather rose in the house to 
critique the Liberal government’s higher education policy, specifically regarding the 
funding of research. Fairweather felt obliged at the end of his address to turn his 
attention to international students and what he saw as disturbing developments in 
policy regarding their presence at Canadian universities. He started by reminding 
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau that Trudeau himself “did not pay an extra fee because 
he was a Canadian student” when he studied at the Sorbonne or Harvard, some-
thing he shared with “hundreds of thousands of people around the world who have 
benefited from the generosity of respective national states.” Thus, Fairweather felt, 
it would be unreasonable for Canada to introduce differential fees for international 
students. Indeed, he argued, it would hurt Canada in the long run: “Some of our 
great international universities which speak really to the world surely would never 
have gained such undoubted reputations if they had a sliding scale that affects people 
from all over the world.” But Fairweather could tell which way policy was trending, 
and so he ended on a plaintive note, offering “a plea that the provinces in this country 
not take what I think is a retrograde step of having different requirements in money 
terms for people who come from outside Canada.”1
Fairweather’s comments can be read as a eulogy2 for a different way of thinking 
about international students. This view was built on a philosophy of international 
aid and co-operation, rather than the current consumer model in which international 
students are customers in a global marketplace, recruited for what they offer to the 
Canadian economy — that is, money.3 In Fairweather’s view, international students 
were travellers, like Trudeau, benefiting from generous countries and bringing the in-
sights gleaned from their education back with them to their homelands. Fairweather 
was expressing a discourse of development through education, one that he saw as 
both to Canada’s benefit and its duty.
Today Fairweather’s view seems like a relic of a long gone age, but less than a de-
cade earlier his view had been dominant among parliamentarians. Before 1970, the 
discourse addressing international students sounded much more like Fairweather’s, 
although often more neo-colonial than the way he formulated it in 1976. After 1970, 
though, Fairweather was out of step with the developing course of policy talk regard-
ing international students, who had come to be discussed as potentially dangerous in-
terlopers in Canada. It is this transition — from targeting international students to be 
recipients of Canada’s self-interested largesse to fearing them as a threat to Canada’s 
economy and social structure — that this article will explain.
The evidence is drawn from public debate in the House of Commons about in-
ternational students, as documented in Hansard. These debates were chosen not be-
cause they were the most important location for policy-making or even because par-
liamentarians are able to coherently speak for the state they govern. As Leo Panitch 
points out, the state and its operation are much broader than the government alone, 
and election to government does not necessarily grant control of all aspects of the 
state.4 American historians of education David Tyack and Larry Cuban make a simi-
lar point in reference to education specifically when they point out that the “basic 
grammar of schooling … has remained remarkably stable over the decades,” despite 
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generations of reformers being elected at all levels of government.5 That is to say, 
the fundamental elements of the delivery of education — for example, the shape of 
classrooms or the division of material into subjects — have remained consistent for 
decades.6 Making substantial policy change is not a simple thing, and new parties in 
power do not necessarily put their unique stamp on policy.
Yet the public debates of parliamentarians are still important records that have 
been underutilized by historians of education. Parliamentary discussions indicate 
the contours of debate at a given moment. Thus they are useful for two reasons 
when undertaking historical policy analysis: on the one hand, they show the range of 
choices that were considered as policy options, allowing us to reconstruct the swirl-
ing cycles of policy debate. On the other, they also reveal the embedded discourses 
operating within public discussion of policy, discourses that often originate outside of 
Parliament but still come to define that debate. Often what is most instructive about 
these debates is not necessarily what gets argued — but what does not. There are as-
sumptions contained within every political position that often go unexamined and 
unquestioned. When a broad array of politicians all share assumptions, one can see 
the power of a discourse. This article is not suggesting that these discussions always 
defined actual policies (although in some cases they did), but instead argues that the 
debates reveal something important about the perceptions of international students 
among parliamentarians.
This article treats parliamentary debates as examples of what Tyack and Cuban call 
“policy talk,”7 and links it to Stephen Ball’s conception of policy as both text and dis-
course.8 Tyack and Cuban describe policy talk as “diagnoses of problems and advocacy 
of solutions.”9 Thus policy talk is not simply a conversation about educational policy; 
instead it is an opportunity for policy-makers to try to lay the groundwork for future 
policy. In this way, studying policy talk requires an attempt to understand the agency 
of politicians, while recognizing that they operate within certain constraints, both po-
litical — the pressure to be re-elected, and governmental — the need to govern society 
and to govern it within certain parameters. As Tyack and Cuban explain, policy talk 
does not always translate to policy creation or implementation, but it defines the range 
of options available and can prefigure the shape of actually enacted policy.10
Because of these constraints — political and governmental pressures — policy talk 
is never generated in a vacuum. Instead, it is freighted with meaning outside of its 
parliamentary context — it is loaded with discourses. By discourse, I mean the (some-
times unspoken) assumptions, values, and notions that underpin and organize policy 
talk. Parliamentarians and policy-makers more broadly operate within discursive 
fields, but they also contest them. Therefore, attending to policy talk is an important 
historical opportunity that reveals these discourses and allows an analysis of how they 
shift and change. Policy talk describes parliamentary debate, the swirling diagnoses 
of educational problems, and operates at the level of talk, because its relationship to 
actual policy-making and policy implementation is not always clear.11 Discourses are 
present within and surrounding these policy conversations, defining their shape and 
content, but these discourses are also being formed and contested within this policy 
debate.12
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International students as a group are the subjects/objects of a sizeable amount 
of policy and policy talk at all levels of the Canadian government, as well as within 
institutions themselves.13 This article is an attempt trace a few prominent discourses 
operating in discussions of policy in the post-Second World War era, to begin situat-
ing the emergence of the discursive construction of “international students” between 
1945 and 1975.
1945–1969: International Students as Welcome Sojourners
In the first twenty-five years after the Second World War, discussions about students 
who were not Canadian citizens14 were firmly located within debates about Canada’s 
changing place in the world. This policy talk was shaped by the discourses emerg-
ing out of Canada’s foreign affairs concerns: Canada’s role in the Cold War and its 
emergence as an international economic power. Even at this early stage, policy talk, 
while ostensibly about education, was never only about education, or only about 
students. Parliamentarians were always framing their discussions of international 
students within a larger set of policy goals, many of which had nothing to do with 
education — or the students themselves.
It becomes obvious while reading the debates about these students that took place 
in the House of Commons that the dominant discourse operating within policy talk 
at the time was that international students were development targets, that is, they 
were worthy recipients of Canadian development funds. But this was not simply an 
act of charity. While the “main objective” of such aid is to promote “economic and 
social development” this objective had to compete with a variety of others, including, 
but not limited to, “strategic, political, commercial, and non-developmental humani-
tarian concerns” that might be in concert, but were sometimes in conflict, with the 
goal of development.15
Parliamentarians’ discussions of international students were also bound up in 
Canada’s notion of itself. Robert Bothwell suggests that, in the period examined here, 
Canada perceived itself to be a junior partner in a North Atlantic “triangle” that also 
included Britain and the United States.16 Within this triangle, Canada imagined it-
self to be a “moral superpower,” in a unique position to serve as a mediator with the 
Third World.17 This was often part of Canada’s self-perception as a “middle power.”18 
Bothwell suggests that the idea of middle power status might have been more wishful 
thinking than fact, in that Canada was rarely listened to on the international stage.19 
Nonetheless, according to diplomat Arthur Andrew, the idea of Canada as a middle 
power became “not a separate agenda item but a philosophical outlook that was 
built into the government’s position on whatever happened to be at hand”: that is, a 
discourse working among foreign affairs policy-makers.20 It had become a core value 
shaping policy talk by 1955.21
On the face of it, aid programs fit well within a self-conception as a moral super-
power, but in the first decade after the Second World War Canada showed limited 
interest in overseas development programs, instead focusing on “diplomacy and se-
curity.”22 It was only when the link between the Commonwealth and international 
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security became clear that Canada began to emphasize foreign aid as part of its for-
eign policy, especially multilateral aid.23 Thus, throughout this period, Canada’s aid 
policy was shaped by the larger Cold War goals of the government.24 Canada targeted 
former British colonies as aid recipients, starting in Asia with the Colombo plan 
in 1950, and then in the Caribbean and Africa after 1958.25 International educa-
tion, including international students, was a small but important part of these aid 
programs.26
Some historians have looked at this period very favourably: Roopa Desai 
Trilokekar has characterized this era as one of “humane internationalism” on the 
part of Canada.27 She argues that aid programs, including programs that gave de-
velopment money to international education, “fit well with Canada’s [international] 
heritage as a non-colonial middle power.”28 Similarly, Costas Melakopides has argued 
that “Canada has been an enlightened and distinguished member of the international 
community” since the Second World War, pursuing a “pragmatic idealism” that re-
flects the “Canadian internationalism” that was at the heart of Canadian mainstream 
political culture from 1945 to 1995.29
But the aid programs were not entirely altruistic: as political scientist Keith Spicer 
put it at the time, reflecting the opinion of many politicians, Canada had “a right 
to expect some worthwhile results” from this transfer of wealth.30 Indeed, Canada’s 
goal was always “political and commercial rather than humanitarian.”31 Aid monies 
had been spent usefully if they contributed to “development” in the form of infra-
structure or if they created political goodwill, especially anti-communist attitudes, 
among the recipients.32 Aid was understood by policy-makers to be “a force in what 
is often termed the ‘war for men’s minds,’” an aspect of the battle to stop the spread 
of communism.33
The same discourses are clearly visible in discussions of international students. 
According to parliamentarians, international students who might learn the skills 
to help their home countries “develop” were the kind of foreign students Canada 
desired. Moreover, students visiting Canada were expected to learn to dislike com-
munism and value liberal capitalism. While politicians may have overestimated “the 
gratitude that aid might generate and how long such goodwill might last,” Canadian 
politicians before 1969 believed that the value of welcoming international students to 
Canada was to be found in the development of both skills and warm feelings towards 
Canada and the West in general.34
Thus, close examination of the parliamentary debate about international students 
illuminates deeply neo-colonial discourses suffusing policy talk. Education has had a 
long historical role in the work of empires, and much of that history echoes in these 
discussions. As John Willinsky has shown, educational systems constructed in the 
classical imperial era for colonized students were not only imperial in content but in 
form; similarly, Canadian parliamentarians regarded international students as targets 
not only for the valuable “developmental” content of Canadian pedagogy, but also 
for the re-socialization that they believed would result from exposure to the perceived 
superiority of Canadian society.35 Policy-makers often spoke in ways that exhibited a 
neo-colonial paternalism.36
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A clear explanation of the idea of neo-colonialism can be found in the work of 
Kwame Nkrumah, the first prime minister of an independent Ghana and one of the 
leading figures in both pan-Africanism and the international non-aligned movement 
of countries trying to resist the influence of both the USA and USSR in the Cold 
War.37 Nkrumah, who saw neo-colonialism as one of the great threats facing African 
nations attempting to free themselves from colonial empires, described a system in 
which states appeared independent but had an economic system whose form was 
dictated by neo-imperial powers according to a neo-colonial model. He insisted that 
this was not simply a matter of economic policy, but that it operated in the “political, 
religious, ideological and cultural spheres” as well.38 Ania Loomba points out that the 
“economic (and social) relations of dependency” that underpin neo-colonialism have 
their roots in the long history of direct colonialism.39 But neo-colonialism emerged 
after the Second World War when, according to Kuan-Hsing Chen, colonial empires 
did not collapse: “rather, the direct territorial mode of control [gave] way to direct or 
indirect political and economic maneuvering.”40 Because parliamentarians seemed to 
believe that education in Canada would give international students the skills required 
to “develop” their home countries in Canada’s image, and, more importantly, would 
ensure that they desired to restructure their home countries in this fashion, their at-
titudes are representative of the ideological and cultural elements of neo-colonialism. 
Their characterization of students was paternalistic in that MPs saw international stu-
dents as somewhat child-like outsiders, coming to Canada to gain the skills necessary 
to “develop.” International students were not considered potential Canadians within 
these debates. Instead they were regarded as sojourners by nature, present in Canada 
due to the benevolence of a generous government, with the assumption that they 
would return to their home countries, taking with them the intellectual and cultural 
rewards of their time in Canada.
Ultimately, these policy discussions reveal more about what politicians assumed 
about these students than about the students themselves. There was little actual data 
offered about these students in Parliament, and when it was offered, it was almost 
entirely quantitative and gave very little insight into the character, interests, or edu-
cational goals of the students themselves.41 Students’ voices were entirely absent. As 
we shall see, even when their actions drew the government’s attention, there was 
almost no interest in the substance of their demands, only to the form of their pro-
tests. Yet parliamentarians regularly spoke authoritatively of these students, of their 
desires, of their place in the world, and of the wonderful experiences Canada was 
providing them. These ideas were only occasionally explicit in policy talk, but they 
ran as a current throughout discussions, by all political parties, of foreign students 
before 1969.
The basic contours of the ideas that were shaping policy talk are visible as early 
as 1953. In a debate about how to spend Canada’s foreign aid funds, Cooperative 
Commonwealth Federation (CCF) MP Stanley Knowles insisted that “nothing is 
more basic to the future peace of the world than that we take far more seriously than 
we have done to date this question of our responsibility to try to assist the underde-
veloped portions of the world.”42
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To this end, Knowles insisted that more money needed to be spent on bring-
ing students from “underdeveloped” countries to Canada. As he lamented, “we have 
spent out of Canadian funds 190 times as much on the training of foreign military 
personnel under NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] as we have spent on the 
training of foreign students” — proof in his opinion that Canada had “not yet faced 
up to the challenge of this other task of helping to train people from these underde-
veloped countries so they might be able to go back and do a job in helping to raise 
the living standards of their own countries in a way that could be done by improving 
their methods of agricultural production and by expediting their industrialization.”43
This view was coherent enough that almost a decade later New Democratic Party 
(NDP) MP Walter Pitman echoed his colleague’s point, telling Parliament that in-
vesting in research and development for underdeveloped countries — including 
bringing foreign students to Canada and “thus enabling them to take this knowledge 
back to their country” — was important because Canada stood “at a fork in the road. 
One road leads to our complete annihilation, while the other leads to the end of 
poverty, sickness and disease throughout the world.”44 For the CCF/NDP, the stakes 
of international education were very high — the fate of the world rested upon it. In 
their view, international students were targets for development, vessels to be filled 
with Canadian technical skills and returned to their home countries to do good.
It was not only Canada’s social democratic party that proposed such ideas. A few 
months after Pitman’s statement that the world faced annihilation unless Canada 
showed a greater dedication to development, Frank McGee, an Ontario MP from 
the governing Progressive Conservatives who served on the standing committee for 
external affairs, echoed the NDP’s points. Arguing that more money had to be dedi-
cated to funding international students interested in studying “engineering, tropical 
agriculture and other faculties which lend themselves to humanitarian aid to the 
underdeveloped countries,” McGee insisted that the government also had to better 
co-ordinate its departments, to “assist in the training of individuals in logical and ef-
fective skills in order to help in the development of these countries.”45
For McGee, as for the CCF/NDP MPs, the issue was not just practical develop-
ment. It was also about developing a different sort of world. While the left-wing MPs 
emphasized the need for development to ensure peace through good relations in the 
future, McGee argued that inviting international students to Canada would have the 
benefit of educating them in democracy, thereby ensuring a more stable and peace-
ful world. Describing this task as important because Canada was “faced with the 
compelling challenge of communism,” and suggesting “the communists act, and we 
react, having lost our initiative,” McGee urged his colleagues, and Canadians more 
broadly, to better support the inculcation of what he called democratic values among 
international students.
It seems to me in this area a unique opportunity is provided for Canadians par-
ticularly around university cities. As I have indicated, there are approximately 
five thousand young men and women coming to Canada from Africa, from 
Asia, and the West Indies and other similar areas. It is the flavor of democracy 
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which they acquire during their experience here which will be of greater value 
to Canada and certainly to the cause of democracy generally than perhaps 
many of the millions of dollars spent in other ways …
These young men and women will return to the countries of their origin and 
will become beyond a shadow of a doubt the leaders and members of the corps 
surrounding the leaders which will guide their respective nations to their ulti-
mate destinies in the coming generation.46
In case his audience was not entirely clear on the stakes, a few moments later McGee 
reminded Parliament of the importance of this effort: “By continuing the good 
work in this direction, already to no little extent commenced, we can provide the 
bulwark of education in democracy and counteract the propaganda on the part of 
the communists.”47 McGee, like his colleagues across the aisle, saw international 
students as more than just learners — they were objects in Canada’s foreign policy 
initiatives. An important discourse is clearly visible here: students who could po-
tentially benefit from Canadian education that would provide them with the skills 
that parliamentarians assumed were needed in less wealthy countries were worthy 
to receive money from the government to gain access to that education. In turn, 
Canada would benefit from the goodwill such charity would create, and from the 
inculcation of Canadian democratic values in these visiting students. This discourse 
excludes international students from being recognized as potential immigrants. It 
also imagines all international students to originate from less-developed countries, 
or perhaps more accurately from Third World countries, which implied both under-
developed and politically unaligned in the parlance of the Cold War.48 In fact, of the 
7,251 international students studying in Canada in the 1960–61 school year, 1,242 
were from (mostly western) Europe and 2,362 were from the US. That is to say that 
about half of the foreign students in Canada were actually from the First World. 
But there was no sign of this in the policy talk among parliamentarians, because the 
discourse shaping the debate meant that international students were always assumed 
to be aid targets.49
International students as aid targets remained a key theme in debates throughout 
the 1960s. Some parliamentarians were even more blunt about the historical role 
of education as colonial development. Robert Thompson, the leader of the Social 
Credit party, told Parliament that “colonialism had its purpose. It brought law and 
order, it trained primitive peoples, it brought education and the chance of a higher 
way of life to the areas that it administered.” But while the need for these “benefits” 
remained, they could “no longer be imposed by force. They must be given in good 
will.”50 Thus he pushed for greater funding to bring more international students from 
Africa to Canada — to continue the historic mission of colonialism, but now with 
an eye towards developing world peace and preventing the spread of communism.51
This discourse remained coherent and meaningful within policy talk until 
at least 1969, although it was still in circulation as late as the 1980s.52 In 1964, 
Arnold Webster, an NDP MP from British Columbia, complimented the federal 
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government on its scholarship program for students from developing countries 
within the Commonwealth, once again arguing that such supports would ensure 
peace and goodwill in the future.53 He was echoed almost word for word the next 
year by his NDP colleague Reid Scott.54 As late as 1969, Liberal Secretary of State for 
External Affairs Mitchell Sharp was still discussing the notion of foreign students as 
recipients of aid without inviting controversy.55
Throughout this policy talk, the idea of international students as recipients of 
aid was premised on certain assumptions — one was that these students came from 
countries that were both less wealthy than Canada and were politically relevant in the 
geo-political landscape of the Cold War. Another was that they were not intending to 
immigrate to Canada, but were instead planning to return to their home countries, 
taking the skills and values they had developed in Canada with them. A third was that 
those values were both superior to the students’ own and were worth spreading for 
strategic reasons. Finally, each of these was based on the assumption that Canada was 
both wealthy and munificent enough to be able to afford these programs. While there 
was broad support among politicians for bringing international students to Canada, 
they were only welcome in specific circumstances that served Canada’s international 
agenda during the Cold War.56
1967–1969: The Sir George Williams University Affair and Shifting Policy Talk
In the long run, the overwhelming threat to Canada will not come from for-
eign investments or foreign ideologies, or even — with good fortune — foreign 
nuclear weapons. It will come instead from the two-thirds of the people of the 
world who are steadily falling farther and farther behind in their search for a 
decent standard of living. — Pierre Trudeau, 196857
As early as 1967, parliamentarians began to raise questions about whether attracting 
international students to Canada still served the country’s Cold War interests. With 
those questions came challenges to the prevailing discourses about international 
students. Asking these questions was Ralliement créditiste MP Raymond Langlois. 
Langlois, himself an educator, inquired of the government about the costs of the por-
tion of the “external aid” program that was being spent on international students.58 
The next day he used the government’s response to argue against funding for foreign 
students — the first MP to do so in the post-war period.
Langlois’s critique of the funding signaled the beginning of an important shift in 
attitudes towards international students in Canada. Langlois started by reminding 
Parliament of the amount of funding received by students who were studying in 
Canada (Langlois claimed it was $5,467.29/year on average)59 and then discussed the 
privilege this represented for these students: “we finance students to come to Canada 
to study, students who do not have the same problems Canadian students have. As far 
as finances are concerned, they are treated better than Canadian students.”60 Langlois 
was just getting started:
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These [the international students] are students who have been changing 
[buying new] cars every year. They are about the brightest students from these 
underdeveloped countries. Some of them do not have to work so hard and 
some attend a minimum of courses. Their financial problems are minimal 
compared with some Canadian students who have to slave their way through 
university.61
It is clear from Langlois’s comments that some MPs were critical of the cost of the 
aid programs for international students. He made this point again a few days later, 
chiding the government for telling Canadians to tighten their belts in a time of high 
inflation, even as they continued to fund foreign aid programs.62 But his critique was 
about more than just money. It was also an attack on the fundamental purpose of 
these programs.
Explaining that he believed that funding foreign students missed the point of 
external aid entirely, Langlois complained that students were given a Canadian edu-
cation “so they can return to their homeland to render their country a service. The 
problem is, Mr. Speaker, they do not go back home.”63 Langlois was referring to 
a United Nations (UN) study that allegedly demonstrated that there were 85,000 
Indian medical students from schools all over the world who had not returned to 
their home country after finishing their training. Langlois explained that in this case 
funding international students was not only unfair to Canadian students but also was 
bad for developing countries. “We are doing [underdeveloped countries] a disser-
vice,” he said, by “taking their best students away from them.”64 Langlois offered no 
Canadian evidence to support his contention that international students were staying 
after finishing their degrees, yet nonetheless insisted that a change in behaviour had 
occurred, one that undermined the long-held goals of the government’s international 
student policies.
Two important assumptions about international students were being challenged 
by Langlois. The first was that international students needed or deserved help more 
than Canadians did. “Why supply foreigners with a remedy and let our own people 
suffer?” Langlois asked, a quick summation of the changing attitude towards inter-
national aid embedded within his comments.65 The second discursive shift within 
Langlois’s policy talk is the complaint that international students were not returning 
home. This was a change from the dominant assumption that foreign students were 
sojourners who would take Canadian values home with them when they left after 
receiving their degrees. In laying out his concerns that international students were 
no longer temporary residents, Langlois was not simply responding to the pressures 
on the government’s budget created by international students — instead, his speeches 
should be seen within the broader context of changing immigration policy.
From 1952 to 1967, as Robert Harney has shown, immigration policy “was in-
tended to secure the type of immigrants that Canada’s political leadership had sought 
shortly after World War II,”66 that is, “American, British, French, Belgian, Dutch, 
Swiss, German, Scandinavian, and Icelandic settlers.”67 In that same period, discus-
sions of international students revolved around the assumption that such students 
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were, virtually by definition, not from those countries. Thus there was no intersec-
tion between immigrants and international students — they were completely discrete 
categories. But by the late 1960s, this was clearly coming to an end. Not only be-
cause, as Langlois had suggested, international students were not performing the role 
they had been appointed, but also because Canada’s immigration policy was changing 
to satisfy the economy’s relentless demand for immigrants.
As Europe’s economy recovered from the damage caused by the war, there were 
fewer European immigrants moving to Canada.68 The Liberal government of the 
1960s responded by seeking what Reg Whitaker calls “managerial solutions to im-
migration problems.”69 They moved responsibility for immigration away from the 
Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration, and placed it within the purview of the 
Department of Manpower and Immigration. A small change in semantics actually 
signaled a significant shift in policy. As Harney explains, “immigration policy has 
always reflected a dialectic between the desired population increase and the impact 
of immigration on Canadian ways or on the racial and ethnocultural composition of 
the country.”70 In the 1960s, with the immigrant groups who were preferred for their 
ethnocultural contribution becoming increasingly scarce, the pressure to increase the 
population to keep up with economic demand drove policy changes — thus the move 
of immigration into the ministry responsible for work. “Immigration was now seen 
simply as an aspect of the employment market and the primary variable in regard to 
immigration was the Canadian economy’s absorptive capacity,”71 which meant a shift 
away from recruiting immigrants who would easily find a cultural home in Canada, 
towards welcoming populations with very different cultural backgrounds who could 
contribute economically. There were discourses about immigration influencing pol-
icy talk that could be used to both justify and resist this shift. Harney describes this 
period of change as “the transformation of polyethnicity from a social consequence of 
recent immigration to its assertion as a permanent feature of the Canadian political 
landscape,” eventually in the form of multiculturalism.
Franca Iacovetta argues that as the population of Canada diversified there was 
a tendency for “gatekeepers” to emerge who set themselves the task of transform-
ing “immigrants into productive, democratic citizens,” in the process pushing them 
to “conform to ‘Canadian ways’ — which usually reflected Anglo-Canadian middle-
class ideals.”72 This gatekeeping was motivated by the cultural concerns that Harney 
traces throughout Canadian history, but it was also a reflection of Cold War fears. 
Immigrants were seen as potentially dangerous, and the federal government and its 
security apparatus were “on high alert and poised to do battle against the variously 
defined threats to the nation’s political as well as social and moral order.”73
Of course, international students were not exempt from these contextual 
shifts — indeed, discussion of them was implicated at their core. That is because they 
came to represent the perceived risks of this new immigration policy. The confidence 
that parliamentarians had had in the civilizing mission of programs that brought 
international students to Canada was eroded by the claim that those students were 
no longer going home after graduation. Instead of sojourners, these students were 
now immigrants, and as such were part of changing immigration patterns and policy. 
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Europe had been the source of 65 per cent of the immigrants to Canada in 1968, 
but by 1984 provided only 24 per cent of immigrants, while Asia was the source of 
50 per cent of immigrants to Canada in 1984, after accounting for only 12 per cent 
in 1968.74 As part of this important change in Canadian society, policy talk about 
international students began to reveal a discourse that imagined them not as happy 
recipients of aid money, but instead as threats to Canadian stability and order.
Specifically, policy talk about international students after 1969 (until at least 
1975) was characterized by discourses of danger. This danger was rarely an academic 
concern, but instead took two forms. One, visible in Langlois’s questions, was an eco-
nomic uneasiness, a fear that international students were going to take funding that 
might have gone to Canadians, or worse yet jobs that could have gone to Canadians.
But perhaps even more powerful was a fear that foreign students might be a bad 
influence on Canada and Canadians, and that they represented a threat to other-
wise orderly higher education institutions. This was certainly the result of deepening 
Cold War tensions. But it also reflects the dialectic expressed by Harney between 
economic necessity and cultural preference, the tension that he suggests has defined 
each era of Canadian immigration policy.75 Harney argues that Canada, more than 
most countries, has conflated “maintaining a viable political state and achieving a 
successful (i.e., integrative) nationalism as an ideology and identity for those who live 
within that state.”76 Therefore defining “Canadian” values and who was and was not 
Canadian had existential importance to some policy-makers. Discussions of interna-
tional students after 1969 were shaped by these fears.
Placing the emerging tension regarding international students within this context, 
one can see that international student discourses changed as a result of larger changes 
in the concept of Canada as a nation, which was then reflected in the policy talk 
about those students. In the 1960s, “the British definition of Canada” that had been 
widely shared in English Canada after the Second World War was discarded, and 
“the new definitions of Canadian identity that emerged remained amorphous” until 
late in the decade.77 The emergence at the end of the decade of what would be called 
multiculturalism and its efforts to organize the state apparatus occasioned resistance 
in the form of growing concern about who or what ideas were being recognized as 
“Canadian”; some of that resistance focused on a category that was, by definition, 
not Canadian: international students.78 Similarly, convincing everyday people to be 
ideologically invested in this new element of the national project required clear de-
lineation of who would be excluded — any national identity has to be constituted not 
only by those it includes but also by whom it excludes.79 The emergence in policy talk 
in the late 1960s of a discourse of international students as dangerous, particularly as 
dangerous potential immigrants, is not coincidental. Instead, it was a small but impor-
tant part of creating a new meaning for the idea of “Canadian.”
The key event in the trajectory of international student discourses from deserving 
recipients of charity to potentially dangerous foreigners threatening the Canadian 
way of life happened at Montreal’s Sir George Williams University in 1969. The 
affair serves as an important turning point, one in which a crisis or a political op-
portunity focused policy talk and offered clear insight into the shifting discourses 
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contained within that policy debate. In this case, the tensions between efforts by 
the government to increase immigration butted up against the cultural and political 
dangers seen to be present in the diversifying population, represented in this case 
by international students. Importantly, it is not likely that the Sir George Williams 
University affair itself caused a shift in attitudes towards international students. As 
has been argued above, the cause of this change was more complex. Moreover, in the 
late 1960s there was an international student uprising that surely shaped parliamen-
tarians’ response.80 MPs evinced an intense focus on the role of international students 
in the event, consistently blaming outside agitators and rarely, if ever, discussing the 
responsibility of Canadian students. This virtual obsession with the role of interna-
tional students suggests that their reaction was not simply a concern about student 
protest generally, but that their response was shaped by other elements. As a result, 
the discussion of the affair offers considerable insight into how dramatically attitudes 
had changed and become the discourses underpinning policy talk by 1969.
In the spring of 1968, students at Sir George Williams University in Montreal 
(now a part of Concordia University) complained to the administration that a specific 
biology lecturer was marking in a discriminatory fashion, assigning lower grades to 
black and Asian students. Although the administration met with the complainants, 
the students did not feel that the school was taking the complaints seriously. Inspired 
by a rising tide of Black Power and anti-Vietnam War activism in Montreal at the 
time, two hundred students occupied the computer room of the campus, which was 
on the ninth floor of the building, holding it from January 29 to February 11, 1969, 
and eventually throwing tens of thousands of punch cards for the computers out of 
the windows of the lab, littering the street below. On February 11, the city police 
attacked the lab to evict the protestors. In the ensuing violence, the computer lab 
caught fire, and in one of the enduring images of the event, a hostile crowd on the 
street below — gathered to counter the student protest — chanted racist slogans as 
smoke billowed from the windows. Ultimately more than a million dollars of damage 
was done to the computers and ninety-seven students were arrested.81
Members of Parliament on both sides of the aisle and from across Canada reacted 
quickly, and strongly. Wally Nesbitt, a Conservative MP from Ontario, brought it 
up in Parliament on January 30, the second day of the occupation. He pointedly 
asked “whether the government is giving consideration to the curtailment of grants 
to foreign students attending Canadian universities under government auspices who 
engage in activities involving breaches of the peace, bloodshed and other acts of dis-
order?”82 Nesbitt was clearly trying to push the government into reacting to what was 
an evolving situation, and that was a continuing theme of the reaction to the affair: 
opposition parties attempting to trip up the governing Liberals. Also clear was that 
international students would be the focus of blame for the events in Montreal.
Much of the parliamentary discussion of the incident was occurring within a 
context in which opposition MPs were trying to embarrass Pierre Trudeau’s govern-
ment on the issue of immigration.83 But there was more than just point-scoring at 
stake in the debate about the affair. Seen in the context of the larger discussion of 
international student policy, the reaction by opposition parties was more than just 
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scapegoating or opportunism; it revealed a real mistrust of international students, 
one that appeared to be both racialized and linked to the changing social location of 
international students from visitors to potential immigrants.
Parliamentarian attitudes towards international students in the wake of the Sir 
George Williams affair demonstrated a great concern about the political and social 
influence of international students on their Canadian classmates. In part this was a re-
flection of the concern expressed by Langlois, that international students — by which, 
as we have seen, parliamentarians meant students from the Third World — were in-
creasingly settling in Canada after their studies. In this case, international students 
were no longer aid recipients but instead were future residents of Canada. As Himani 
Bannerji argues, Canada’s “imagined community” had historically been concomitant 
with “whiteness”; international students (as part of a larger shift in immigration) were 
seen as a threat to the coherence of this identity.84
The Sir George Williams affair was “the immediate spark that set off a Black renais-
sance” in Montreal, a renaissance that was informed by international anti-colonialism 
and Black Power ideas.85 These ideas, which grew in popularity in Montreal after a 
stirring speech was given by Stokely Carmichael at McGill in 1968, had originally 
arrived with anti-colonial activists from the Caribbean. Among the most prominent 
figures in crafting this anti-colonial critique were Rosie Douglas, an international 
graduate student from Dominica, and Alfie Roberts, a native of St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines. Both were arrested during the Sir George Williams affair.86 This is not to 
say that the Sir George Williams affair was a foreign issue. As David Austin argues, the 
protests were clearly “an autochthonous response to racial discrimination in Montreal 
and Canada in general, and evidence of the unwillingness of Black Canadians to suf-
fer it.”87 But the participants in the affair “conceived of their efforts as an attempt to 
bring democracy to the community, the country, and the world”88 — they were part 
of an international struggle against neo-imperialism, as well as mounting a challenge 
to the racist basis of Canadian identity in the 1960s.89
Therefore, for parliamentarians the Sir George Williams affair was not simply 
an example of student unrest, but was instead part of an international trend that 
challenged the earlier basis upon which international student policy talk had been 
premised. That earlier discourse of Canada as a generous benefactor and interna-
tional students from the Caribbean as the recipients of Canada’s largesse was deeply 
rooted in international student policy talk; the Sir George Williams affair threatened 
to explode such notions. Thus many parliamentarians reacted angrily, and interna-
tional students were seen, not as important allies to be recruited in the Cold War, 
but instead as ungrateful troublemakers who threatened the stability of Canadian 
universities.
After the opening salvo on January 30, the Progressive Conservatives pressed their 
advantage, questioning any minister they could about the events in Montreal — the 
secretary of state for External Affairs, the solicitor general, the minister of Transport, 
the minister of Finance, the minister of Manpower and Immigration, and the min-
ister of Justice, and, of course, the prime minister.90 Their demands focused on the 
government launching a full inquiry.
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Perhaps because the government refused such an inquiry, opposition MPs offered 
their own theories about the root causes. All of them pointed out the prominence of 
foreign students (one Liberal MP reported that forty-five of the ninety-seven arrested 
were non-Canadians),91 but many went much further. Ralliement créditiste MP 
Gilbert Rondeau demanded to know whether the government was going to open an 
inquiry to determine the role of “Mao followers” in the events at Sir George Williams 
University.92 Similarly, his fellow créditiste, Henry Latulippe, asked whether or not 
“it would be advisable to change or to put off the approaches made to China, in 
order to ascertain whether that communist country was involved in those acts of 
sabotage?”93 Others suggested that this was because the government permitted “a 
large percentage of foreigners to come into Canada,” some of whom then went on 
to “cause trouble in our universities.”94 Several MPs suggested forceful solutions: a 
Liberal recommended deportation for disorderly international students;95 others rec-
ommended pulling loans to rebellious students, foreign or Canadian,96 or cutting 
funding for international students who participated.97 There was also great interest in 
the exact legal standing of the students involved, and discussion of whether their visas 
could be revoked.98 It was clear by 1969 that whatever energy there had been to teach 
international students “the flavour of democracy” had been eclipsed by new concerns.
Even as parliamentarians were debating what to do about the occupation, it was 
already being put to other purposes. On February 13 (two days after the occupation 
had ended), in a debate about abortion, créditiste Henry Latulippe recommended 
that instead of making abortion more available, “some way should be found to 
change the conditions making pregnancy undesirable.” Latulippe insisted that “if 
the mother felt able to provide an education and a decent living to her child” then 
she would eschew abortion. In that case, Canada “would not have to bring over mil-
lions of immigrants. We could go on building up our society, which would develop 
and also be healthier. We might never witness again what happened at Sir George 
Williams University.”99 Within two days of the end of the stand-off, a new discourse 
had come into play and was influencing policy talk widely.
One consequence, then, of the Sir George Williams affair was that MPs who 
feared expanding immigration had found an easy touchstone for their complaints. 
The affair captured many of the fears and tensions then in play in discussions of 
immigrants, including international students. Almost none of the parliamentary dis-
cussion addressed the Canadian students involved, even though they were techni-
cally the majority, at least among the arrestees.100 Instead the emphasis was on the 
foreign danger represented by events like those that took place at Sir George Williams 
University.
The discussion of the Sir George Williams affair is evidence of a change in 
the discussion of international students. From 1945 to 1969, the general opinion 
among parliamentarians had been that foreign students were going to benefit from 
Canada — that Canadians would shape their views and behaviour, and in doing so 
would advance Canada’s interests in the Cold War. But the Sir George Williams 
affair demonstrated, in the eyes of many MPs, that international students were a 
threat to Canada — that they represented a fundamental challenge to the structure 
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and well-being of Canadian society. The activists at Sir George Williams had rebelled 
against the racism of Canadian society, and parliamentarians’ response was to re-
evaluate international students as a group. Coming as it did in a time of general con-
cern about the dangers represented by new arrivals to Canada, the shadow of the Sir 
George Williams affair would loom in the minds of MPs well into the next decade, 
and would help precipitate a shift towards mistrust and exclusion in policy talk about 
international students.101
1969–1975: International Students as Dangerous Immigrants
After the Sir George Williams University occupation, the next six years of policy 
talk regarding international students was defined by discourses of risk and danger. 
Sometimes this was framed as political danger, more often as economic competition, 
and occasionally as a threat to academic standards. Regardless, the tone had shifted, 
and the self-satisfied neo-imperialism of the 1950s and 1960s had given way to a 
much more fraught discussion of the future of Canada, as imagined through inter-
national students.
The notion of international students as political threat was consistently framed as 
an issue related to student activism and the dangers of Marxism or various versions 
of communism. In 1974, Conservative MP Duncan Beattie railed about foreign stu-
dents that “are allowed to enter our country without proper screening and without 
follow up supervision. People who would not otherwise qualify for landed immi-
grant status are flooding into the country under cover of our lax foreign student pro-
grams.”102 For Beattie, the real danger was political radicals. He linked the lax student 
entry requirements to another program he was concerned about, the refugee system 
for Chileans fleeing the Pinochet coup. Beattie was clear about his concern — as with 
international students, it was the lack of screening for political radicals. “Is there 
some magic formula for deciding who is a bona fide refugee,” he asked, “or is it only 
necessary for a person to sidle up to a Canadian immigration officer and say: ‘I am a 
Marxist terrorist and the present government in Chile won’t let me engage in subver-
sive activities?’ ”103 In the early 1970s, international students were a political threat, 
potential vehicles for radical (and foreign) political philosophies.
Beyond the political risks represented by international students, there were also 
the economic risks — that is, the danger that they might take the place of Canadians, 
either in school or in the job market. In the months after the Sir George Williams 
University affair, a new tension surfaced within policy talk regarding international 
students — their place in the farm economy. In May 1969, the minister of Manpower 
and Immigration, Allan MacEachen, promised Parliament that, for the summer of 
1969, his department was reducing the number of international students from devel-
oping countries who were being brought to Canada on exchange, so that there would 
be more jobs available to Canadian students looking for work.104 In July, he reviewed 
the effects of his policies, telling Parliament that he felt they had been mostly effective 
and mentioning that reducing the number of jobs for foreign students was part of 
why they had been effective.105
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The discursive tension regarding international students and work persisted in 
policy talk throughout the next decade. There was often great concern about the 
danger of international students taking jobs that could go to Canadian students.106 
These debates seem to have had an effect on policy, since the Liberal government in-
troduced a work visa system that restricted jobs for international students.107 Robert 
Andras, the minister of Manpower and Immigration who was behind the policy, 
made it clear that it would only deny work to a specific category of international stu-
dents, those who had come on their own, by which he meant were economically self-
sustaining. For those students who had been promised economic support by Canada, 
work would still be allowed. He also promised that any international student could 
apply for “jobs that cannot be filled by Canadians.”108
Soon after the farm work debate, international students were once again the sub-
ject of policy talk that evinced an uneasiness with the economic changes Canada 
was undergoing. While parliamentarians had previously hoped to impart useful skills 
to international students, after 1970 there was a growing concern about interna-
tional students taking places in Canadian professional schools. This concern dem-
onstrates the complex discourses in action: on the one hand, international students 
were a threat because they were staying in Canada after graduating. On the other, 
professional skills taught to international students were wasted. Regardless of inter-
national students’ actual plans, they were discursively excluded from consideration 
as Canadians — they were outsiders, and investments in their education represented 
money, space, and time that was not a benefit to the Canadian populace.
This debate coalesced around a concern about medical school. In light of the advent 
of Medicare, according to Conservative MP Jake Epp, there was a pressing demand for 
spaces for medical students. Yet “a high proportion of foreign students” were enrolled 
in Canadian medical schools — taking seats that could potentially go to Canadians.109 
While the federal government tried to insist this was a provincial question,110 the 
Tories continued to press the government, demanding that it account for the exact 
number of foreign students in Canadian medical schools, as well as their immigration 
status and the cost to the government of educating them.111 Eventually they got their 
numbers, and Conservative MP Philip Rynard announced them in Parliament — 26 
per cent of the University of Toronto’s medical class that year had been non-Canadian, 
and each student was costing the government $75,000.112 Despite numbers that were 
meant to shock, the government’s response was to again aver that this was a provincial 
responsibility. Regardless of the response, the point was made, and the line drawn: 
international students, Rynard and others could insist, were surely taking Canadian 
spots and on the taxpayer’s dime. More importantly, Canada could clearly not benefit 
enough from this arrangement to justify support for it. There was no indication of 
the notion of the goodwill this might create, as would have been present a few years 
earlier. Nor was there any sense that these students might be future Canadians. Policy 
talk about international students clearly demonstrated that the discourses underpin-
ning those discussions had shifted since the 1960s.
Although there continued to be some concern about the political activism of in-
ternational students even into the 1980s,113 and considerably more concern about 
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Canadians losing out on seats in classrooms,114 the bulk of the parliamentary dis-
cussion about international students between 1970 and 1975 revolved around their 
place in Canada’s economy — as workers, or as recipients of government support. 
Compared to the paternalist charity that was so central to discussions of interna-
tional students before 1970, these policy discussions were shaped by a discourse that 
showed a growing concern that international students were not only taking seats 
away from Canadian students, but also jobs. Moreover, they featured the clearest 
statements made to that point of the idea that financial support for international stu-
dents was a cost that could not be borne by Canadian universities or the government.
The work visa policy the government introduced in 1969 explicitly labeled an 
emerging split in the discussion of international students — the division between re-
cipients of charity, who by 1973 were seen as a danger to Canadian students, and 
the more appealing students, who were economically self-sustaining. It is a familiar 
discourse to a contemporary audience, but it had surprisingly little take-up at first in 
the 1970s. For example, in a long debate in 1972 about amendments to the trans-
fer of funds to provinces for education, there was substantial concern expressed by 
members of both government and opposition parties about how much of the transfer 
money paid for international students to attend school.115 A wide variety of opin-
ions were expressed, including some uneasiness with increasing international student 
fees116 and even the expression of the old ideal of international students as worthy 
beneficiaries of charity.117 Eventually the discussion focused on the simple reality 
that funding was needed for schools, and that costs were climbing rapidly. Robert 
McCleave, a senior Conservative caucus member, summed up this tension with a 
quote from the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada: “If adequate fi-
nancial support is not forthcoming the universities, having made what economies are 
appropriate and possible, have two options: turn away students who wish to attend 
or allow quality to deteriorate.”118
With this bleak pronouncement hanging over the debate, international students 
were primarily positioned as costs that the system could not bear. When differential 
fees arose as a possible solution, Tory Marcel Lambert announced that he had “never 
heard anything so chauvinistic as this idea.”119 He still complained about the size of 
the grant the federal government was giving to provinces to manage higher educa-
tion, but he did not follow through with the idea that some of the cost could be 
borne by international students. In fact, it was not until 1987 that a parliamentarian 
would openly embrace the higher fees paid by international students as a solution to 
declining government transfers.120 While today policy-makers look towards interna-
tional students to make up budget shortfalls, in the 1970s the discussion focused on 
them as an economic threat.
There were more discursive shifts on their way, and even as parliamentarians fret-
ted about the risks of “Mao followers” coming to Canada and filling low-wage tem-
porary jobs on farms, the conditions to force a seismic change in discourse and policy 
talk were already present. As Bryan Palmer has said about the period before 1970, 
“the Canadian state basked in the seeming calm of what has come to be regarded 
as the highwater mark of a Fordist regime of accumulation.” But, “the glue” for the 
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post-war compromise between labour and capital that had made Canada’s welfare 
state possible was “primarily economic, and it started to exhibit stresses in the 1960s. 
By 1975, the glue was gone and the settlement was falling apart.”121
What was happening was a shift in international capitalist economies: “faced with 
stagnant or shrinking markets, rising resource prices, increased foreign competition, 
and a labour movement ready to defend its living standards, capital experienced 
reduced profit margins on existing investments and few profitable new opportuni-
ties.”122 The result was that capital demanded concessions from the state, which in 
Canada “involved new subsidies to capital in the form of loans, grants, and tax con-
cessions, thus underwriting investment and shifting the cost of the welfare state onto 
employed workers.” For governments, this meant “deficits ballooned as expenditures 
rose on corporate subsidies, the unemployed, and public sector wages.”123 So dawned 
what historian Paul Axelrod calls the “more scholar for the dollar” era in higher ed-
ucation.124 Facing these sorts of pressures, parliamentarians began to rethink their 
attitudes towards international students. None of the existing discourses would be 
sufficient — international students could not be regarded as targets for aid, as every 
dollar now had to be accounted for and demonstrate its purpose. On the other hand, 
emerging global trade relationships and a diversifying population meant that nativist 
exclusion also no longer served anything but crass domestic politicking.
Table 1 
International Student Enrolment Rates in Universities
International 
Students All Students Percentage
1958–59 5,988 94,400 6.3
1961–62 7,900 128,864 6.1
1973–74 14,246 479,686 3.0
1976–77 28,744 543,489 5.3
Sources: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Education division. University Student Expenditure 
and Income in Canada, 1961–62: Part 1 — Non-Canadian Students Catalogue number 
81–519, Ottawa, ON, 1963; Max von Zur-Muehlen, The Foreign Student Issues in 1976–77 
(Ottawa, ON: Canadian Bureau for International Education, 1977), 30–31.
Thus new discourses were necessary. While some would try to insist on the impor-
tance of past ideas about international students — Gordon Fairweather believed “very 
firmly that this sort of ‘scholars for dollars,’ surely one of the most demeaning slogans 
of the past two or three years, could have serious implications for Canada”125 — the 
end of the post-war settlement meant new priorities for the Canadian state. Just as 
they were in the 1960s and 1970s, international students continued to be objects 
upon which parliamentarians could project their intentions in this new era. This is 
one final important legacy of this period: international students were infrequently 
discussed in the 1940s and 1950s. But by 1970 they had become an important and 
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oft-discussed topic in Parliament, a trend that continues today. Likely this reflects 
their growing numbers and the increasing attention paid to higher education as a 
whole. Absolute numbers of international students in Canada had climbed alongside 
overall enrolment in university, although not at the same pace — a smaller proportion 
of university populations were non-Canadian in the mid-1970s than had been the 
case in the late 1950s (see table 1 on the previous page).
Conclusion
Policy talk about international students has always been shaped and defined by the 
context within which it has taken place. In the years after the Second World War, 
Canadian politicians looked at international students through a Cold War lens, and 
as targets for Canada’s largesse. In this neo-colonial view, international students were 
sojourners, short-term visitors to Canada who would return to their home countries 
with the lessons learned in Canadian universities and having adopted the values of 
Canadian liberal capitalism. But by the time the anti-racist protests of students at 
Sir George Williams University occurred in 1969, policy talk about international 
students had shifted, reflecting a fear that international students might settle in 
Canada and a discourse that suggested they were dangerous outsiders threatening 
the structure of Canadian society. These discourses were part of a broader discussion 
of Canada’s changing immigration regime, but they meant substantial changes in 
the way international students were discussed in Canada. For modern policy ana-
lysts, this historical view is important — a reminder that education policy is never 
generated in a vacuum. Instead, it is talked about and ultimately created by policy-
makers who are deeply enmeshed in the larger questions of their time. As such, it 
behooves us to carefully reconstruct the context within which policy is talked about 
and ultimately constructed, in order to understand the underlying assumptions that 
contribute to its shape.
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